Blog

Things were different for the coalition. Western powers did have access to a wide range of world-class technologies, from space surveillance to remotely controlled systems such as robots and drones. But for them, the war in Afghanistan was not a war of survival; it was a war of choice. And because of this, most of the technology was aimed at reducing the risk of loss, rather than achieving a clear victory. Western forces have invested heavily in weapons that could keep soldiers safe from danger — aviation, drones — or technology that could speed up the provision of immediate medical attention. The focus of the West has been on things that keep the enemy at arm’s length or protect soldiers from damage, such as battleships, body armor, and roadside bomb detection.

The main military priority of the West was different: in the battle between the great powers. Technologically, this means investing in hypersonic missiles to match the missiles of China or Russia, for example, or in military artificial intelligence to try and outsmart them.

The Afghan government, caught between the two worlds, ended up having more in common with the Taliban than the coalition. This was not a war of choice, but a fundamental threat. Yet the government could not develop in the same way as the Taliban; its development was hampered by the fact that the foreign military constituted the main technologically advanced force. While the Afghan army and police have certainly provided bodies for the fighting (resulting in many deaths), they have not been able to build or even operate modern systems on their own. Western countries did not want to supply Afghans with the latest weapons, fearing that they would not be supported or might even end up in the hands of the Taliban.

Take the Afghan Air Force. He was equipped and trained with less than two dozen propeller driven aircraft. This made it possible to provide at least a little direct air support, but not always. And working with the US meant that Afghanistan could not seek technology transfer elsewhere; in fact, he is stuck in a phase of delayed development.

So what does this tell us? It says that technology is not the driving force behind conflict and is not a guarantee of victory. On the contrary, it is a means of assistance. And even rudimentary weapons can triumph in the hands of motivated, patient people who are willing – and able – to make whatever progress is needed.

It also tells us that the battlefields of tomorrow may be very similar to Afghanistan: we will see fewer purely technological conflicts in which the armed forces with the most firepower win, and more old and new technologies applied side by side. This already looks like this in conflicts like the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and this pattern may appear even more over time. Technology may no longer win wars, but innovation can, especially if one side is fighting an existential battle.

Christopher Ankersen Associate Professor, Department of Global Issues, New York University. He served in the United Nations in Europe and Asia from 2005 to 2017 and in the Canadian Forces from 1988 to 2000. Author and editor of several books, including Civil-Military Cooperation Policy and the is the future of global politicsHe holds a PhD from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Mike Martin is a former British Army officer who speaks Pashto who has visited Afghanistan on numerous occasions as a political officer and advised British generals on their approach to the war. He is now a visiting fellow at King’s College London and author of the book Intimate warwhich describes the war in southern Afghanistan since 1978. He holds a PhD from King’s College London.